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The elimination of the marketing quota system that regulated the peanut market since the 
1930s has been accompanied by the emergence of marketing contracts between farmers 
and peanut buyers (mainly peanut shellers). Two types of contracts have been observed, 
forward contracts for delivery at harvest or at a later date and “option to purchase” 
contracts. We analyze the clauses of contracts used by major shellers in order to infer the 
motivation behind these contracts (i.e., risk sharing, reduction of transaction costs, 
improve coordination, exercise of market power, etc.). The analysis points out that the 
main role of the contracts is to replace the marketing structure existing prior the 2002 
Farm Act, where peanut marketing was quite regulated. In this sense, the reduction of 
transaction costs associated to the need for coordinating a continuous supply of 
homogeneous quality seems to be the most plausible explanation. 
 
Keywords: Agricultural marketing, peanuts, economics of agricultural contracts. 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
Production of peanuts in the U.S., as well as production of several other crops, was 
deregulated by the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 (hereafter, 2002 
Farm Act) that replaced the tradition marketing quota system with a Marketing 
Assistance Loan Program (MLP). This has been a dramatic change for the peanut sector, 
which had operated under a marketing quota system that fixed production prices and 
quantities, although with modifications, since the 1930s. As a result, peanut prices 
dropped below the former support levels and production shifted significantly from less to 
more productive areas (Dohlman et al., 2004).  
 
This transition has been accompanied by the use of contractual arrangements between 
producers and crop processors (peanut shellers). According to Dohlman et al. (2004) the 
lack of price information and marketing options in the peanut market rules out some of 
the strategies available to producers of major commodities, such as timing sales based on 
cash or future prices. It appears that a lack of potential trade volume has been a 
disincentive to establishing a peanut futures contract. As an alternative, the main price 
risk management strategy adopted by peanut farmers since 2002 has been to enter into 
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private marketing contracts with peanut buyers, typically peanut shellers. Approximately 
four-fifths of growers used such contracts in 2003.  
 
The “option” contract is a hybrid of a forward and an option contract that gives a peanut 
sheller the exclusive right, but not the obligation, to purchase a specified volume of the 
crop from the farmer. It should be noted that while the option contract is totally new, 
forward contracts were used in the past by peanut farmers (Hancock et al., 2002)  
 
As contracts, among several other reasons, can be used to exercise market power (e.g., 
Salanie, 1997) their analysis is important to identify any welfare implications. The issue 
is especially important in the peanut market where according to Dohlman et al. (2004) 
“currently, there are only 10 active shelling companies, down from 45 in the early 1980s 
and 92 in 1970. Two companies now control about 73 percent of purchases and two-
thirds of peanut buying points” (pp. 20). Thus, the purpose of this paper is to discuss the 
possible reasons that explain the use of these contracts and through the analysis of their 
clauses to address whether there are possible effects on the welfare of peanut producers 
(as processors are the concentrated group) and for the normal functioning of the MLP.  
 
In the absence of statistical evidence to produce a numerical analysis, the methodology 
used in this paper consists of studying the characteristics of two marketing contracts that 
are currently used by two major peanut shellers, whose identities are kept anonymous. 
While this is a qualitative analysis, it allows us to review the clauses included in the 
aforementioned contracts and contrast them with those reasons present in the economic 
literature as motivations for the signature of contracts. Furthermore, another reason to 
analyze the specific terms of the contracts is that the way that market power can be 
present in a contract depends on the particular characteristics of the market where they 
are signed.  
 
We start the paper with a review of the main reasons behind the use of contracts in 
agriculture emphasizing those related to marketing contracts. Next, we review the recent 
changes in the peanut market as a needed background for the analysis and describe the 
characteristics of the peanut contracts. The next section discusses the clauses found in the 
peanut contracts in the light of the economic literature of contracts and we briefly sketch 
the features of the current peanut marketing. Finally we present some conclusions.   
 
II.  Brief Review of Reasons for Contracting in Agriculture 
 
Before reviewing the main reasons for the use of contracts in agriculture it is important to 
distinguish between two types of agricultural contracts: production and marketing 
contracts, since they focus on different aspects of the supply chain.  
 
Production contracts detail specific farmer and contractor responsibility for production 
inputs and practices, as well as mechanism for determining the payment. This type of 
contracts often specifies inputs to be used, production guidelines and allows for the 
contractor to give technical advice and make field visits. In many cases the ownership of 
the crop is in the hands of the contractor, not of the farmer and the contract is signed   3
before the production process starts. Examples of this type of contracts are those related 
to organic products or identity preserved crops or specialty crops (Sykuta et al, 2003). 
 
In contrast, marketing contracts are agreements between a buyer and a producer that set a 
price and/or outlet for a commodity before harvest or before the commodity is ready to be 
marketed. The producer usually remains fully responsible for the management decisions 
during the production process with limited direction from the contractor. Marketing 
contracts can take many forms. The most commonly used marketing contract is the fixed 
forward price contract, under which farmers can completely eliminate the price risk. 
Other forms of marketing contracts do share the price risk between the buyer and seller. 
Examples of such contracts are deferred payment contracts, basis contracts, deferred 
price contracts, minimum price contracts, hedge-to-arrive contracts, a short futures hedge, 
cost-plus contracts, and the purchase of put options (Harwood et al., 1999). In addition, 
marketing contracts often specify product quantity, delivery schedules and include 
clauses about product specification and may set standards for a grower’s production 
method. Also they include articles about compensation and quality control, thus, 
depending on how homogeneous is the product, it may include a minimum standard 
requirement (for homogeneous products) or a number of characteristics, grades, etc. for 
heterogeneous products.   
 
We will focus the remaining part of this review on the characteristics of marketing 
contracts as they are the type of contracts observed in the peanut market. Thus, the main 
purpose will be to identify the reasons for farmers to enter into a marketing contracting 
relationship and the types of clauses that later will be used to analyzed the contracts in the 
peanut market. 
 
Existing economic literature on agricultural contracts shows that there are two main 
reasons for entering into contracts: the first one is a way to share risks and the second one 
as a mean to reduce transaction costs.  Furthermore, within the transaction cost motive 
the economic literature differentiates between the asset specificity and hold up problem, 
which is more typical of production contracts.    
 
By entering into a marketing contract farmers and processors can share the risks inherent 
to different aspect of the productive activity. Thus, two main risks can be considered: 
yield risk (i.e., risk associated to the production) and price risk. The combination of these 
two risks can give origin to income risk.  
 
Farmers face yield risk when they enter into a forward contract which stipulates the 
deliver of certain amount of commodity that farmers expect to harvest. If the contract 
does not specify any clause related to weather problems then, the farmer will bear all the 
risk as he would be forced to purchase part of the commodity in order to comply with the 
contract. This can be significantly expensive due to weather problems the supply of the 
commodity is particularly short and the farmer has to buy the commodity in the spot 
market. 
   4
Where marketing contracts are particularly effective is when its objective is to share price 
risk between the parties. The typical case is a forward contract which specifies the price 
that the farmer is going to receive. However, as point out in Harwood et al. (1999) both 
processors and farmers can be subject to price risk in case that the forward price agreed in 
the contract depends on a variable price to be observed such as a futures price.       
 
Marketing along a supply chain involves a number of stages each one of them with a 
number of costs. By contracting farmers and processors can coordinate these stages and 
minimize the costs. This is the aspect of the supply chain management and of transaction 
is emphasized by Bogedoft et al., 2004. Furthermore, these contracts can contain 
incentives, for instance for producers, to avoid opportunistic behavior and to comply with 
the product delivery.  
 
Asset specificity refers to durable investments that are undertaken in support of particular 
transactions, as it is always possible that the transaction will be stopped, i.e., hold up. By 
contracting and setting a compensation scheme it is possible to reduce the costs related to 
the hold up and therefore promote the required investment, which otherwise would have 
been stopped or reduced to a non-optimal level.   
 
The costs of search, measurement and monitoring are of particular importance as a reason 
for marketing contracts.  Information costs often arise in market transactions and they 
include the search cost of finding a buyer and a seller in the transaction, the measurement 
cost of determining product quality, and the monitoring cost of ensuring that all terms of 
a transaction are met including quality and quantity specifications, delivery terms, and 
payment (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992; MacDonald et al., 2004). 
 
The costs of search are particularly important for processing firms, which are capital 
intensive and exhibit fixed capacity. Cost minimization of these firms requires producing 
at full capacity at a steady rate that requires a continuum and stable flow of commodity of 
the right specification entering into the productive process. One possibility for the 
processing firm is to store enough raw materials to transform during the entire processing 
season (i.e., until the agricultural commodity is harvested again and becomes abundant), 
this would increase enormously the storage, financial and management costs associated to 
the required capital to buy the inventory and to maintain the required storage capacity. 
The other possibility, a more convenient one for the processor, is to have a constant flow 
of commodity coming from farms to processing plants maintaining only a reduced 
quantity of inventories (pipeline or working inventories). This possibility, however, 
increases the costs of coordination, as the processor would like to reduce the risk of stock 
out and not having enough raw materials to process. The situation is even worse if the 
processor has already signed forward contracts to deliver the processed product.  
 
In all the mentioned reasons for contracting it is possible that one or both parties can 
exercise market power by imposing contract terms that forces the other party to assume 
most of the risks, a price that is closed to the marginal costs but not as low as will make 
the party not to sign the contract, or by splitting some costs in an uneven way. How 
market power can appear in a contract depend on the particular characteristics of the   5
transaction and therefore it makes important to analyze the specific terms of the contract 
that we do in the next sections.    
  
III. Characteristics of Peanut Contracting 
 
Before analyzing the characteristics of peanut contracts it is worthy to start with a 
description of the previous peanut marketing system.  
 
1.  Peanut Marketing Background 
 
The 2002 Farm Act eliminated the marketing quota system that although with several 
modifications, was the core of the support of the peanut since 1933.  
 
Until the 1996 Federal Agricultural Improvement and Reform Act (1996 Farm Act), the 
peanut program was a two-tier price support program, with peanut production destined to 
food products (e.g. peanut butter, snacks, candies, etc.) limited to an annually established 
quota (i.e., “poundage quota”) designed to uphold prices at US$ 610 per short ton. Non-
quota peanut production (i.e., the so-called "additional") was destined for the export or 
the domestic crushing market (i.e., peanut oil and meal) and, in 2001, it was eligible for a 
support price of US$ 132 per short ton (USDA-ERS, 2002). Figure 1 presents in a 
schematic way the US peanut marketing year before the 2002 Farm Act.  
 
Figure 1. US Peanut Market before the 2002 Farm Act 1/
Demand=Shellers 
Peanuts above the
marketing quota have Shellers purchase their requirements during the harvest and stock as much as they need,   
to be contracted before because buybacks are expensive. They have to be purchased at a price equal to 100 per-
September 15th,  cent of the quota value plus handling charges determined by the market association and a-
otherwise they must be  pproved by CCC, to cover all costs incurred with respect to such peanuts for inspection 
marketed under additional warehousing, shrinkage, and other expenses.                                                                   
nal price support loans.
US Harvest Season - Aug./Jan. US Non Harvest Season - Feb./Jul.
Seasonal Supply=Marketing quota 2/ + Stocks 3/ Seasonal Supply=Imports + Buybacks 4/
Pre-season Peanut Marketing Year - August/July
Notes:
1/ Based on 1996 Farm Act legislation.
2/ Supply for exports and crush are the quantities previously contracted.
3/ Inter-year stocks in the form of shelled peanuts.
4/ Buybacks are stocks under the CCC purchased by food processors above the marketing quota  
 
It is clear from the figure that marketing peanuts was a regulated activity, with farmers 
disposing their peanuts almost at harvest either by contracting them for export or crush,   6
selling them as part of the marketing quota or pledging them to the CCC to receive the 
support price for additional peanuts. Under such a system, there were no incentives for 
farmers to invest in on-farm stocks since the entire harvest had to be marketed through 
the channels set by the USDA. Furthermore, due its functioning the system did not 
provide incentives to the formation of a spot market for peanuts. 
 
The quota system was replaced by a marketing assistance loan program for peanuts under 
which producers can get a government loan at a pre-determined marketing loan rate by 
pledging their crop as collateral.  During the term of the loan (i.e., 9 months) producers 
can either forfeit the loan or repay it at the lesser of the Loan Repayment Rate plus 
interest or the USDA-set repayment rate, which has purpose of minimizing potential loan 
forfeitures and storage costs and promoting competitive marketing of peanuts both 
domestically and internationally. Producers that do not take the marketing loan are 
entitled to a so-called deficiency payment that equals the difference between the loan rate 
and the repayment rate. In contrast with the previous peanut program, under the current 
regime all peanut producers have equal access to the marketing assistance loan program. 
Figure 2 represents the marketing year under the current legislation. 
 
Figure 2. US Peanut Market after the 2002 Farm Act
Demand=Shellers 3/
US Harvest Season - Aug./Jan. US Non Harvest Season - Feb./Jul.
Seasonal Supply=Harvest+Stocks 1/ Seasonal Supply=Imports + Stocks 2/
Peanut Marketing Year - August/July
Notes:
1/ Inter-year stocks (these stocks may be in shelled peanuts form).
2/ Intra-year stocks (e.g., stocks under MLP).
3/ A relatively small proportion of peanuts are exported un-shelled (e.g. 13 % in 2003)
    otherwise shellers are the first buyer of un-shelled peanuts.  
 
One aspect that is worthy to note in figure 2 is that during the period from February to 
July the US crop competes with imports. Under the previous regime higher domestic 
prices made attractive the US peanut market for exporters who took advantage of the 
increasing marketing access in the tariff rate quota for peanuts (see Fletcher and 
Revoredo, 2002 for an analysis about tariff rate quotas for peanuts). However, the new 
regime exporting peanuts to the US has lost its attractiveness and the domestic market is 
basically being supplied by domestic growers.    7
 
2.  Marketing Contracts for Peanuts  
 
Table 1 summarizes the main clauses of the two observed contracts for peanuts: the 
forward contract and the option to purchase contract.  
 
Table 1: Comparison of the Characteristics of the Forward and Option Purchase 
Contracts 
 
Clause Forward Contract Option to Purchase Contract
Background information Farm planting intentions, specifying area under
irrigation, variety and average yield.
Farm total acres planted, specifying are irrigated
and non irrigated and net pounds (not clear if
planned or actual in case the option is signed after
harvest)
Acreage planted commitment Farmer will plant no less than 90 % of intended
acreage and inform the sheller about the actual
acreage.
None
Quality contracted Specifies type, grade standard and whether
peanuts are high oleic.
Specifies that peanuts are segregation 1, fit for
consumption and complying with the federal
regulations related to food safety and use of
pesticide.
Production standard The use of pesticides not specifically labeled for
peanuts is a breach of the agreement. Also seller
warrants that the peanuts shall be fit for human
consumption.
The use of pesticides not specifically labeled for
peanuts is a breach of the agreement. Also seller
warrants that the peanuts shall be fit for human
consumption.
Product An specified quantity of peanuts (in pounds). An specified quantity of peanuts of segregation I
(in net pounds).
Price Two modalities: (1) a flat rate in US$/farmer
stock ton and (2) a premium above the Loan
Repayment Rate at the time of delivery.
A premium above the Loan Repayment Rate at
the time of delivery. In addition, farmers are paid
an option price per net ton. of peanuts.
Discounts and premiums Based on USDA price table for peanuts. Based on USDA price table for peanuts.
Delivery date Set in the terms of the contract. The option can be exercised at any time since the
sign of the option to June 30 (end of marketing
year for peanuts).
Delivery place Depending the case it is set in the contract at a
buying point, at a storage facility or at specific
collection point.
At the exercise of the option, if the peanuts are
under storage the farmer will transfer the
warehouse receipt and the sale will be FOB at the
storage location or if not under storage it will be
FOB the inspection point.
Transportation cost It is paid by the sheller, even if there is multiple
deliveries
Transportation cost to the inspection point is paid
by the farmer while from the warehouse to the
shelling plant is paid by the sheller.
Peanut inspection Farmer agrees that the sheller/representatives will
have access to inspect the planted acreage and
perform chemical tests.
Farmer agrees that the sheller/representatives will
have access to inspect the planted acreage and
perform chemical tests.
Right of first refusal Farmer will not sell uncontracted peanuts before
offering them first to the sheller and at the same
terms. If the peanuts are not sold, the sheller has
again the right of first refusal over those peanuts. 
Farmer will not sell segregation 1 peanuts before
offering them first to the sheller and at the same
terms. If the peanuts are not sold, the sheller has
again the right of first refusal over those peanuts. 
Failure to deliver Farmer has to deliver the agreed amount of
peanuts and if part of it is not covered the sheller
can covered at farmer's expense. Wheather related
problem is presented as an exception to the rule.
Farmer has to reimburse the option price received
from the sheller. In addition, the sheller is entitled
to a compensation set by law and the sheller is
entitled to a temporary/permanent restraining
order against the farmer.  
 
It should be noted that both contracts are quite similar being their main difference their 
purchasing procedure, i.e., the fact that one is a forward contract and therefore a purchase 
of the peanuts is mandatory (unless some of the conditions for breaching the contract   8
occurs) and the other is an option and therefore only produces a purchase when the owner 
of the option decides to exercise it.   
 
There are several aspects of the contracts that are basically the same.  In terms of the 
productive background of the farm they require the farmer to provide similar information 
(i.e., where the peanuts are planted –irrigated versus non-irrigated land- variety and 
average yield). With respect to aspects associated to quality and production standards, 
these are regulated by USDA and therefore they have necessarily to be met, furthermore, 
both contracts consider the possibility of inspecting the farms to verify that farmers are 
complying with the safety rules. In addition, the contracts set similar delivery conditions 
such as the transfer of warehouse receipts or the delivery of the contracted peanuts at the 
buying or inspection points. The contracts also include similar condition about the right 
of first refusal that grants shellers the preferential right to purchase uncontracted peanuts 
produced in farms that have contracted. Finally, if farmers fail to deliver the peanut, the 
sheller is entitled to purchase peanuts at expense of the farmer. 
 
Aspects that are partly different are the pricing of the peanuts, which are basically 
associated to the different nature of both contracts. However, not only both contracts 
consider forward pricing formulas that are the value of the repayment rate plus an agreed 
premium but also the discounts and premiums applied due to quality, which are based on 
USDA regulations. In terms of transportation costs, when they exist (i.e., excluding the 
case when the peanuts are in storage in which case warehouse receipts are transferred) the 
forward contracts cover transportation costs from the farm to the delivery point while in 
the option contract the farmer assumes the transportation cost to the inspection point. 
 
IV. Discussion about Peanut Contracts 
 
In this section we address two issues, first is a qualitative analysis of some of the clauses 
in the peanut contracts that are not regulated by USDA. Second, we sketch how the 
different contracts can be used to organize the marketing of peanuts.  
 
1.  Analysis of the Main Clauses of the Peanut Contracts 
 
The first issue is related to the pricing of peanuts in both contracts. Except in the case 
when the forward contracts indicate a flat price, the price stipulated in the contracts is set 
as a premium over the repayment rate. On the one hand, unfortunately, there is no 
information about the premium paid for the peanuts to make inferences about how they 
are set. On the other hand, it should be noted that under these contracts farmers are not 
exposed to price risk. Thus, in the case when the farmer has made use of the marketing 
loan program, the final price that farmers receive for the peanuts will be the marketing 
loan rate plus the premium, being the only source of variation any discrepancy related to 
the quality of the peanuts sold. However, the processor bears the price risk as ultimately 
the repayment rate is set by USDA, and it can be above or below the marketing loan rate. 
This might be a reason why shellers decide to use the option to purchase type for some of 
the contracts. 
   9
Production risk is mostly borne by the farmers as they agree to deliver a determined 
amount of peanuts of certain variety and grade. In the case of the forward contracts, there 
is a clause in which failing to deliver the peanuts due to weather problems is consider an 
exemption to the rule that the sheller will purchase the required peanuts at the expense of 
the farmer. This clearly indicates some level of production risk sharing.     
 
The condition about the right of first refusal, i.e., the right to make an offer before offers 
from others is a common clause in contracts. Some analyses consider that this condition 
might discourage competition and the seller may receive lower prices (Purchasing Law 
Report, 2001), however, it is not clear whether this is more than a commercial practice. 
 
In summary, based on the two types contracts there is little scope for market power that 
can affect farmers as they are protected by the MLP. If there is market power one might 
speculate on a bilateral monopoly situation where shellers and USDA compete in the 
peanut market such as is the case presented in Nadolnyak, Revoredo and Fletcher (2003), 
where USDA competes by setting the repayment rate, which reduces the cost of the 
marketing loan program, and shellers compete by decreasing their demand for peanuts 
and therefore forcing USDA to carry more stocks over and therefore pressing in a 
reduction of the repayment rate.    
 
2.  Contracts as a Marketing Device for Peanut Market 
  
The purpose of this section is to sketch more than formally model, a possible functioning 
of the current peanut marketing. This is to contribute to the understanding of how the 
peanut market operates after the 2002 Farm Act, a task that has been reported as elusive 
(see Dohlman, 2004).    
 
To understand why a sheller would be interested to enter into a contract let us consider 
the following straightforward marketing alternative. At the harvest time, the sheller 
purchases enough peanuts to keep his plants running for a number of months not 
worrying about future needs as he knows that they can be acquired from peanuts under 
storage. In the absence of a spot market and lacking of on-farm storage, farmers who 
have not sold their crop at the harvest enter into a marketing loan program and store the 
commodity until a sheller approaches them to buy their commodity. In which case, they 
would repay the marketing loan and deliver the commodity to the sheller.  
 
If peanuts were a homogeneous commodity the aforementioned strategy would be quite 
feasible, however, as the sheller has to put together a supply of peanuts of a determined 
variety he would need to go through the searching process of finding the required 
quantity of peanut variety.
2 It is important to recall that peanuts for feed and food are 
stored under the marketing loan program (FSA, 2004). This can be costly in the sense if 
that year was a bad crop year; quantities of determined grade might be scarce increasing 
the searching costs as the sheller would need to go thorough several farmers. In addition, 
                                                 
2 This is similar to processors purchasing futures contracts in order to hedge against price 
risk but not to accept delivery of the commodity.    10
even if the peanuts were graded before entering into storage, they would need to be tested 
again, to verify that their characteristics remained the same during the time in storage (i.e. 
no presence of aflatoxin, or other materials).  
 
By entering into a contract, processors automatically create a network of suppliers bound 
to deliver the commodity according the agreed conditions. The processor can establish its 
contracts to reflect obligations taken on the delivery of the processed product and also 
considering any random change in the demand for his processed product. Thus, as shown 
in figure 3 either before the harvest or at the harvest time processors can issue a number 
of (1) contracts for immediate delivery, possible at a flat price, (2) forward contracts for 
later delivery and/or (3) option to purchase contracts.   
 
Figure 3. New Contracts as a Strategy for Marketing Peanuts
Demand=Shellers 3/
Shellers offer harvest delivery contracts and Shellers exercise the option contracts depen-
option-contracts. Deliveries at harvest go to ding on the peanut requirements and on the
shellers pipeline stocks, while peanuts under repayment rate. There are two instruments for
the option contract are pledge as a collateral negotiation: quantity of option contracts exer
under the MLP. cised (shellers) and repayment rate (CCC).
US Harvest Season - Aug./Jan. US Non Harvest Season - Feb./Jul.
Seasonal Supply=Harvest+Stocks 1/ Seasonal Supply=Imports + Stocks 2/
Peanut Marketing Year - August/July
Notes:
1/ Inter-year stocks
2/ Intra-year stocks (e.g., stocks under MLP).
3/ A relatively small proportion of peanuts are exported un-shelled (e.g. 13 % in 2003), otherwise
    shellers are the first buyer of un-shelled peanuts.  
 
The forward contracts allow the processor to receive the peanuts promptly without having 
to store it on farm. Furthermore, due to the presence of the marketing loan program, the 
storage cost is basically assumed by USDA, while in the previous system, shellers had to 
carry more peanuts over because of the costs of purchasing peanuts that were in storage. 
   11
The role of the option to purchase contract can be understood as a negotiation mechanism 
(see figure 3), as a safeguard measure in case USDA increases the repayment rate too 
high, in which case the sheller decides simply not to exercise the option, or as a 
mechanism to increase easily their supply of peanuts in case of an unexpected surge of 
the demand for peanuts.    
 
One implication of the aforementioned description of the peanut marketing process is that 
the spot market plays a small role in the marketing of peanuts and therefore it explains 
why USDA has had problems setting the repayment rate for the MLP. If as reported by 
USDA (Dohlman et al., 2004) four-fifths of the peanut are marketed through contracts, 
then the spot market is a thin market with all the implications for price discovery 
analyzed by Sheldon (1996). The problem is also evident in the fact that the USDA-
National Agricultural Statistical Service does not report price for the period from January 
to July 2004 because the number of transaction was too small to be average price or 
because they were not published in order to avoid disclosure of individual operations 
(USDA-NASS, 2005). 
 
V.  Conclusions 
 
The analysis points out that the main role of the contracts is to replace the previous 
marketing structure existing before the 2002 Farm Act, where peanut marketing was 
quite regulated. In this sense, the reduction of transaction costs related to the coordination 
of the supply chain associated with the continuous flow of peanuts of a determined grade 
seems to be the most plausible explanation. 
 
It is clear that with both forward and option contracts the price risk is absorbed by the 
sheller, while the farmer bear the risk of producing or purchasing the required amount of 
peanuts to comply with the contract. Therefore, given the amount of information 
available it is not possible to infer any sort of market power. 
 
The two contracts available for the analysis can be combined to create a network that 
allows the reduction of the stock out risk of peanuts, which would increase the average 
cost of production and minimize the cost of maintaining high levels of inventories.   
 
Finally, the implications of a thin spot peanut market is that USDA will continue having 
difficulties in their search for an appropriate cash price when trying to compute the 
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